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Abstract
This study explores the nature of the marital earnings premium for African men in South
Africa using the September 2004 Labour Force Survey and the Labour Force Survey Panel
(2001 ￿2004). We show that a robust and positive premium to marriage in cross-sectional
estimations is substantially reduced after controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Furthermore,
we ￿nd evidence of an additional source of endogeneity created by the positive selection into
marriage of men with faster earnings growth in the initial periods of the panel. Our results
are to be expected if the payment of bridewealth or ilobolo, by a prospective husband to the
bride￿ s family, is a signi￿cant constraint to marriage for African men.
1 Introduction
A well documented ￿nding internationally is that men who are married earn signi￿cantly more than
men who are not married, even after controlling for di⁄erences in the observable characteristics of
these men. The reasons for the marital earnings premium have been explored extensively in the
literature over the past thirty years. The two main and competing explanations are the productivity
hypothesis (marriage makes men more productive and therefore they earn more than other men)
and the selection hypothesis (men who are selected into marriage are those men who would also
do better in the labour market). To control for selection on the basis of time-invariant individual
attributes, studies have used panel data to estimate ￿xed e⁄ects models. Typically this is found
to reduce the size of the marital earnings premium, indicating that selection into marriage does
matter. But in most studies, a positive and signi￿cant earnings premium to marriage persists. The
remaining di⁄erential is interpreted as the ￿returns￿to marriage, and much of the literature then
explores why marriage would increase men￿ s productivity.
Although ￿xed e⁄ects estimation techniques remove the problem of individual heterogeneity,
they do not control for another source of endogeneity bias in the earnings estimation. If men
with faster earnings growth are positively selected into married, then the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator
will continue to overstate any real gains to marriage. Few studies in the literature refer to this
possibility, but those that do ￿nd no evidence of such selection.
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the nature of the marital earnings premium
among African men in South Africa, using household survey datasets that are currently available.
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1What makes a study of the marital earnings premium in South Africa particularly interesting is
the payment of bridewealth (known as ilobolo) to validate a traditional African marriage. If ilobolo
payments are a constraint to marriage then we might expect to ￿nd evidence of selection into
marriage not only on the basis of unobservable attributes but also on the basis of high earnings
growth. Because our study is limited fundamentally by the nature and quality of available data,
our secondary objective, by default, is to outline these limitations, thereby highlighting the kind of
information that needs to be collected in South African household surveys (and which is collected
routinely in comparable surveys in other countries).
We use the September 2004 Labour Force Survey to show that a robust marital earnings pre-
mium exists for African men at the cross-section, and to compare the premium for marriage and
cohabitation. To investigate the selection of men into marriage, we use the six waves of the Labour
Force Survey Panel from 2001 to 2004. We ￿nd that the marital earnings premium falls consider-
ably when we control for individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Furthermore, we show that earnings growth for
unmarried men is positively related to the probability of marriage in the subsequent years of the
panel, suggesting that the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator may still have upward bias.
In the next section, we summarise the literature on the marital earnings premium and we
describe the practice of bridewealth in South Africa. In section 3, we analyse the marital earnings
premium among African men using cross-sectional data. In section 4, we investigate the quality
of available panel data in South Africa, and we test for the selection e⁄ects of marriage. The
last section summarises our empirical ￿ndings and highlights simple ways in which data collection
marriage in subsequent panel studies in South Africa could be improved.
2 Background and context
Since the 1980s a growing body of literature, predominantly from the United States (US), has
developed to account for the common ￿nding that married men earn signi￿cantly more on average
than men who are not married. A robust marital earnings di⁄erential has been found to exist even
after controlling for observable di⁄erences between married and unmarried men. Estimates of the
conditional marriage premium have generally ranged between 10 and 40 percent, comparable in size
to the race and union wage di⁄erentials in the US, for example (Korenman and Neumark 1991).
Two main hypotheses have emerged to explain the marital premium. The dominant theory,
which draws on Becker￿ s (1965, 1981) model of household time allocation, is that marriage makes
men more productive. Marriage allows for economies of scale in home production and the spe-
cialisation of labour, with men traditionally specialising in market activities and women in home
production. Married men will therefore have greater opportunities to accumulate human capital in
market activities than single men, thereby increasing their productivity and wages.
The competing hypothesis (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987) is that men who are married would
have done better in the labour market regardless of their marital status. In other words, there is
a selection of men into marriage based on individual characteristics that are also rewarded in the
labour market and that translate into higher wages. Rodgers and Stratton (2005: 6) provide an
extensive list of personal traits that might be valued in both the marriage and labour markets: abil-
ity, attitude, self-esteem, congeniality, loyalty, honesty, dependability, leadership, industriousness,
and even physical appearance.
Attempts to control for selection into marriage have included estimating cross-sectional earnings
equations in a two-stage Heckman selection model (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987); using twin or
sibling data to control for genetic and/or family endowments (Loh 1996, Antonovics and Town
22004); and, most often, using panel data on individuals to control for time-invariant unobservable
characteristics in a ￿xed e⁄ects model (Korenman and Neumark 1991, Cornwell and Rupert 1997,
Gray 1997, Hersch and Stratton 2000, Stratton 2002, Rodgers and Stratton 2005).
The general consensus that emerges from this empirical literature is that selection into marriage
matters ￿but not that much. Regardless of the data or methodology used, a mostly consistent
￿nding is that, even though accounting for selection may reduce the marriage premium, a substantial
portion remains. Selection e⁄ects are typically found to be responsible for less than 20 percent of
the premium (Stratton 2002).
Another possible selection mechanism at play, referred to by only a few studies, derives from
the endogeneity of marriage. If men with faster wage growth are more likely to get married, then
this selection e⁄ect would not be controlled for in ￿xed e⁄ects models. To test if the variation in
changes in marital status over time is endogenous, Korenman and Neumark (1991) and Gray (1997)
look at whether single men, who have faster wage growth in a preceding period, are more likely to
get married in a later period. However, neither study ￿nds evidence of such endogeneity.
Given that a substantial portion of the marriage premium cannot be explained by selection
e⁄ects, a large part of the international literature focusses on trying to uncover the nature or causes
of the productivity e⁄ect. Here the evidence is more mixed. Controlling for the number of years
married, Korenman and Neumark (1991), Gray (1997) and Stratton (2002) ￿nd that wages continue
to grow at a faster rate throughout the marriage. This is taken as some evidence of specialisation
occurring over the course of the marriage. However, the results in Cornwell and Rupert (1997)
and Hersch and Stratton (2000) imply that the bene￿ts of marriage are better described by an
intercept shift rather than a steeper earnings slope for married men. Cornwell and Rupert (1997:
292) suggest that ￿such a shift in the wage-generating process might be regarded as the e⁄ect of
￿ settling down￿￿a kind of structural break involving adjustments in market work and homework
in the move from single to married life￿ .
Other attempts at understanding the causal mechanism driving the productivity e⁄ect have
involved using hours worked by the wife as a proxy for specialisation in the household. The pre-
diction is that married men whose wives work longer hours will earn less than married men whose
wives work fewer hours, or who do not work at all. Gray (1997) and Chun and Lee (2001) ￿nd the
expected wage penalty for married men whose wives work, or work longer hours. In Jacobsen and
Rayack (1996), however, the premium on being married to a full-time housewife does not survive
the endogeneity correction, suggesting that wives may adjust their working hours in response to
their husbands￿wages.1 As a more direct measure of specialisation, Hersch and Stratton (2000) use
the actual time spent on housework by men, but they ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect of this variable on
earnings and little change to the marriage premium itself.
A third explanation for the marriage premium considered in the literature, although to a lesser
extent, is employer favouritism. Employers may discriminate against unmarried men (or married
men whose wives work) because of a perceived lower need or because of a preference for men who
adhere to certain social norms. But evidence of a wage premium also for self-employed married
men casts doubt on this hypothesis (Jacobsen and Rayack 1996).
All of the studies cited above have examined the relationship between marital status and earnings
1Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) and Loh (1996) even ￿nd some evidence that working wives may have a positive
e⁄ect on men￿ s earnings, implying that either complementarities in household time allocation or positive assortative
mating may be at play. Similar evidence has been found for the UK ￿while Blackaby et al (1998) found a signi￿cant
negative relationship between wife￿ s working hours and men￿ s wages for some occupations in the early 1980s, a decade
later they found that this penalty had been replaced by a premium, albeit small, for almost all occupations (Blackaby
et al 2007).
3among men in developed countries. In this paper we investigate evidence of a marital earnings
premium among African men in a country where bridewealth traditionally is practiced, and where
we may therefore expect selection to be a more important part of the explanation for the marital
premium.
In South Africa, ilobolo is paid by a prospective husband to the bride￿ s family to validate a
customary marriage. Historically, this payment was in the form of cattle and was substantial
enough to require that men left their homesteads to engage in ￿long periods of wage labour￿(Hunter
2004:132). In more recent years, the custom of ilobolo has changed in that cash has replaced cattle
as a means of payment. However, research suggests that the payment of ilobolo remains a signi￿cant
hurdle to marriage and is key to explaining why marriage rates are lower, and mean age at marriage
higher, among Africans than among other population groups in the country (Budlender et al 2004,
Hunter 2004, Makiwane 2004).
National household surveys in South Africa do not collect information on the payment of ilobolo.
However, information collected in the 1998 wave of a regionally-based panel study (the KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study) gives some indication of the extent to which ilobolo is still practiced
and its value. Of the 725 married African respondents aged 60 years or younger in the sample, three
quarters reported ilobolo payments with marriage. Payment typically involved a combination of
cash, cattle and livestock: about 68 percent reported that the ilobolo payment included cash; 75
percent reported payments of cattle and a further 13 percent, of livestock.2 The average value of
ilobolo reported for Africans married from 1985 to 1998 was approximately R20 000 in 2000 prices3
(or almost thirteen times the average monthly real earnings of African men in the 1998 sample).
The practice and value of bridewealth suggests that selection may account for a larger portion
of the marital earnings premium in South Africa than has been found in studies for the United
States for example. First, we would predict that men with unobservable qualities that are valued in
the labour market will be more able to a⁄ord ilobolo and get married. Second, while little evidence
of the endogeneity of marriage has been found in the international literature, we might expect a
dynamic selection problem for South Africa: if the payment of ilobolo is a constraint to marriage,
then faster wage growth may itself be a determinant of marital status.
We would also anticipate signi￿cant di⁄erences for African men who marry and those who
cohabit with their partners. A small part of the international literature on the marital earnings
premium investigates whether there is an earnings premium also for cohabitation. The expectation
is that a premium would exist, but that it would be smaller than that found for married men. This
is because a cohabiting relationship is likely to be less stable and to involve less specialisation (as
￿nancial responsibilities are generally shared more equally between the partners). Both Loh (1996)
and Stratton (2002) ￿nd a signi￿cant earnings premium for men who cohabit in the United States,
and that the size of the premium is roughly half that for married men, as expected.
Although cohabitation generally can be seen as a middle-class choice in most developed coun-
tries, in South Africa it seems to be more prevalent amongst the poor (Budlender et al 2004). In
their study of marriage patterns in South Africa, Budlender et al (2004) highlight that cohabita-
tion is more common among Africans than the other population groups. If cohabitation among
African couples is a second-best strategy for those who cannot a⁄ord to get married, then we would
2Most respondents reported that ilobolo was ￿fully paid o⁄￿ when they started living together (71 percent or
383/542 observations), a further 10 percent reported that the payment was now complete, and the remainder that
part of the payment was still owed.
3This value is consistent with reports in the literature of ilobolo typically ranging from R10 000 to R25 000
(Kaarsholm 2005, Gustafsson and Worku 2006).
4anticipate a far lower earnings premium, if any, for men who cohabit.
3 Analysis of the Marital Premium at the Cross-section
3.1 Data and sample
We start the study on the marital earnings premium among African men in South Africa using cross-
sectional data collected in the September 2004 Labour Force Survey (LFS 2004:2). The LFS 2004:2
sampled almost 30,000 households, of which approximately 76 percent (or 21,761 households) were
African. We choose this nationally representative data set both because it collects comprehensive
labour market information and because, in contrast to earlier Labour Force Surveys, the question
on marital status distinguishes between marriage and cohabitation.4 Like all national household
surveys in South Africa, however, there is very little information collected explicitly on marriage.
In contrast to the data sets used in the US for example, there are no questions asked about the
length of marriage or about time spent on housework. There is also no background information
collected, for example on the education of respondents￿parents, which could be used to instrument
for marriage.
In Table 1, we compare the mean characteristics of employed African men by four categories of
marital status: currently married; cohabiting; previously married (divorced or widowed); and never
married. In 2004, approximately 43 percent of the sample of employed African men older than 15
years was married, 18 percent reported cohabiting with their partner, and a further 4 percent was
previously married. The remaining 36 percent reported never being married.
TABLE 1 HERE
Average hourly earnings are clearly highest among married men, and lowest among men who
have never married or who are cohabiting with their partners.5 However, the table also describes
clear di⁄erences in the observable characteristics of these samples of employed men: on average,
African men who are married are older than never married men and men who cohabit; they are
signi￿cantly more likely than other men to report post-matric (beyond Grade 12) education; and
they are also more likely to work in the formal sector and in a large ￿rm (of 50 employees or more).
These characteristics typically are associated with higher earnings.
Men who are married are also more likely on average to live with children, and particularly older
children (aged 7 to 14 years).6 For children younger than 7 years, there is little di⁄erence between
married and cohabiting men, a ￿nding which is consistent with current research that identi￿es a
large proportion of African children born outside of (customary or civil) marriage (cf. Gustafsson
and Worku 2006).
4There is some concern about the reliability of information provided by respondents reporting on marital status
in household questionnaires (see Budlender et al 2004). In particular, Budlender et al suggests that among Africans,
cohabitation may be under-reported both because some cohabitors may not be willing to acknowledge that they
are not married, and because ￿the term is often misunderstood, especially when translated into di⁄erent languages￿
(Budlender et al 2004: 5). However, as Budlender et al (2004: 23) report in their study, we also ￿nd here that data
on marriage and living together are generally consistent, with clear and expected di⁄erences between the two groups
of men.
5We assigned the mid-point of the earnings bracket to those whose earnings were reported in brackets ￿ this
amounted to approximately 22 percent of the sample in the September 2004 LFS.
6In the LFS 2004:2, as in other Labour Force Surveys in South Africa, it is not possible to establish consistently
whether these children are biologically related to a particular man in the household.
53.2 Estimation
We use a standard Mincerian earnings equation and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation to
test for evidence of a male marital earnings premium at the cross-section. The dependent variable
is the log of hourly earnings (W)7, the independent variables include a vector of marital status
dummy variables (Mi) as well as a vector of other observable individual and job characteristics
(Xi), and "i is the error term:
ln(Wi) = ￿ + ￿Mi + ￿Xi + "i (1)
Table 2 reports the results from four regressions, with the simplest (I) including only three
marital status indicators, the omitted category being never married. Without any other controls,
regression I shows that for all three categories of marital status, hourly earnings are signi￿cantly
higher than for never married men, although the premium is considerably higher for married men
in particular. African men who are married are estimated to earn 69.5 percent more than men who
have never married, at the cross-section.
TABLE 2 HERE
When other explanatory variables are included in the regression, the size of the marital earnings
premium declines considerably but it remains robust and signi￿cant. In regression II, where we
control for the age and education of respondents, the coe¢ cient on the marriage dummy falls
to 0.318. When we control for an extensive range of job characteristics, including whether the
individual works in the formal sector and in a large ￿rm, as well as 9 occupation, and 11 industry,
categories, it almost halves (to 0.166), but remains signi￿cant and sizeable. In regression IV, where
we add also the number of children in the household, the coe¢ cient increases slightly to 0.176
(a premium of approximately 19 percent).8 In contrast, the estimated coe¢ cient for cohabitation
declines to zero as soon as we control for individual and job characteristics.
In Table 3, we report the results for the earnings regressions when the sample of African employed
men is sub-divided by employment type. The results show that the marital earnings premium for
African men exists at the cross-section for both the self-employed and employees.
The ￿rst two regressions report the results for wage employment, with regression VI adding
other information about the nature of employment which is collected only for employees, including
whether or not the employment is permanent and the length of current employment. Married men
are signi￿cantly more likely than other men to report being in permanent employment (80 percent
compared to 63 percent of men who are not married), and they report a longer length of current
employment (11 years compared to 6 years). When these more extensive controls are included
in the earnings equation, therefore, we ￿nd that the estimated marital earnings premium among
employees declines quite considerably from 0.18 to 0.11, although it is still strongly signi￿cant.
In regression VII, which is restricted to the self-employed, a coe¢ cient of 0.149 on the marriage
dummy is obtained, indicating that married men who are self-employed are estimated to earn about
16 percent more than otherwise (observably) identical men in self-employment. The robust earnings
7We imputed an hourly earnings value for approximately three percent of our sample for whom missing values
were reported, about half of whom was married. The imputation hardly changes the estimate of average earnings
and our results are not a⁄ected by this imputation.
8We also controlled for whether or not a married man￿ s spouse was resident in the household, but this had no
e⁄ect on these earnings estimations. About 23 percent of our sample of employed men who report being married also
report their spouse not currently resident in the household. The obvious explanation for this is the temporary (or
circular) labour migration of either the husband or the wife (see for example, Posel and Casale 2006). We found a
comparable marital earnings premium when married men in the sample are restricted to those with resident spouses.
6di⁄erential for married men with self-employment suggests that the marital premium cannot be
explained by employer discrimination in favour of married men. However, it is not possible to
conclude therefore that the di⁄erential which remains in the earnings regression can be attributed
to the e⁄ects of marriage itself. Rather, the estimated coe¢ cient may be biased upwards both
because of the omission of unobserved time-invariant variables that a⁄ect outcomes in both the
marriage and the labour market, and because variation in marital status may not be exogenous
to earnings. Our ability to address these problems in the cross-section is greatly limited by the
availability of appropriate instruments in the LFS 2004:2. We therefore turn to a less detailed, and
therefore somewhat ￿ cruder￿dataset, but one which permits ￿xed e⁄ects analysis using panel data.
TABLE 3 HERE
4 Selection and the marital earnings premium
4.1 Data and sample
Two possible sources of panel data in South Africa are the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study
(KIDS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) Panel. The KIDS data, collected over three waves from
1993 to 2004 for one region of South Africa, potentially o⁄er a rich source of information because
questions have been asked about the payment of bridewealth or ilobolo. These questions have only
been included in one wave of the panel (in 1998), however. Also, and more restrictive for our study,
comprehensive labour market information is not collected consistently for the employed9, marriage
and cohabitation are not distinguished, and it is di¢ cult to interpret the marital status information
collected.10 In the ￿xed e⁄ects analysis, we are also limited by a very small number of ￿switchers￿ .
Between 1993 and 1998, only eight percent of the sample of employed African men in the panel
(representing less than 50 observations in each wave) changed marital status.11
An alternative dataset is the LFS panel, pre-released by Statistics South Africa in January 2007
and the ￿rst source of national panel data in the country. The LFS panel comprises six waves of
data, collected at six month intervals, from September 2001 to March 2004. The advantages of
these panel data for our study are that detailed labour market information is collected and the
sample is considerably larger than that for KIDS. In the sample of 15,224 employed African men
in the panel, 787 individuals switched from not married to married, and 294 from married to not
married.
9For example, we cannot distinguish formal from informal sector employment. The KIDS data distinguish between
￿regular￿, ￿casual￿ and ￿other forms of self employment￿. This does not automatically translate into formal and
informal sector employment ￿regular employment, for example, may entail working in an unregistered business or
without legal and social protection. However, this information is not collected. Occupational categories are also not
consistent across the self-employed and employees. The omission of these variables, found to be highly signi￿cant in
the cross-section earnings estimations using the LFS 2004:2, will generate upward bias in the marriage coe¢ cient.
10In both 1993 and 1998, information on marital status is collected through a question about the individual￿ s
spouse. In 1993, there were four possible responses: spouse ￿lives in the household￿, spouse deceased, no spouse
and spouse ￿absent￿(coded 99). In 1998, this response list was expanded to six options: ￿divorced/separated￿and
￿multiple wives￿were included as possible responses. Furthermore, ￿absent￿was replaced by ￿else￿(also coded 99),
and ￿no spouse￿ was replaced with ￿not yet married￿. It￿ s not clear what ￿absent￿ means in 1993, particularly in
the context of labour migration, where spouses may not live in the household. It seems likely that ￿absent￿con￿ates
divorced/separated and non-resident spouses, and it is also possible that the option ￿no spouse￿ includes divorced
and separated spouses. The spouse code 99 therefore is unlikely to convey the same marital status information in
1993 and 1998.
11Furthermore, all switchers were from not married to married, and less than half of these were clearly ￿rst
marriages.
7However, there are a number of limitations in the length and scope of the panel, and in the nature
of information collected, which restrict our analysis. First, the three-year period of the panel is a
relatively short span of time over which to examine changes in marital status. Furthermore, because
the survey is designed as a rotating panel, with a twenty percent rotation of the sample in each
wave, many individuals appear in less than six waves. Second, the tracking unit for the panel is the
dwelling place rather than the household, and the panel therefore consists only of those individuals
who stayed in the same dwelling; individuals who left the dwelling could not have been matched
over time.12 We therefore will not be identifying any change in marital status which coincides also
with a change in the dwelling place. Third, the unit of analysis is the individual. No attempt
has been made to link individuals to household members who have remained co-resident over time,
and consequently, there are no household-level variables that can be used in our study. Fourth,
no weights have been provided for the LFS panel and there is no obvious way of generating these
weights. It does not seem possible to link individuals in the panel back to their information (both
individual and household) in the original LFS datasets, as unique identi￿ers have been replaced.
Fifth, and frustratingly for our particular study, the LFSs prior to September 2004, and therefore
all the LFSs included in the panel, do not distinguish between marriage and cohabitation.
TABLE 4 HERE
In Table 4, we compare the sample of African employed men in the rotating panel with the
original sample surveyed at the cross-section, for September 2001 (or wave 1 of the panel) and
September 2003 (wave 5 of the panel). The di⁄erences in the average characteristics of the samples
are not that large, given the concerns raised above. However, because married or cohabiting men
are less likely than other men to move from a dwelling, they are over-represented in the panel, and
this obviously becomes more pronounced over the course of the panel.
The con￿ ation of marriage and cohabitation into a single category in the LFS questionnaires
clearly creates di¢ culties for our study. In section 3 (Tables 2 and 3), we presented earnings re-
gressions where the estimated coe¢ cient for marriage was consistently and signi￿cantly di⁄erent to
that for cohabitation. Whereas the premium for marriage was positive and robust in all speci￿ca-
tions, we found no evidence of a premium to cohabitation. Rather, among employees speci￿cally,
the estimated coe¢ cient was negative and weakly signi￿cant. The implication is that any earnings
di⁄erential identi￿ed for the combined category of married/living together will underestimate the
￿true￿premium to marriage.
4.2 Estimation
We run two models to estimate the marital earnings premium using the LFS panel dataset. First,
to provide a benchmark for comparison, the panel structure of the data is ignored and the six waves
are simply pooled. We use OLS to estimate the earnings equation:
ln(Wit) = ￿ + ￿Mit + ￿Xit + ￿i + ￿it (2)
where Wit represents the hourly earnings of individual i in time t, Mit is a vector of marital status
variables, Xit is a vector of individual and employment-related explanatory variables, ￿i is the time-
invariant error capturing unobserved individual-speci￿c characteristics, and ￿it is the idiosyncratic
or time-varying error.
12Statistics South Africa (2006) acknowledges also that because their matching procedures (both manual and
computerised) found many ￿mismatches￿or inconsistencies, data were edited across the waves.
8The pooled estimation ignores the possibility that ￿i may be positively correlated with marriage
if unobserved attributes valued in the labour market are also valued in the marriage market. We
control for these individual e⁄ects in the second model by estimating the ￿xed e⁄ects or within
transformation:
ln(Wit) ￿ ln(Wi) = ￿FE (Mit ￿ Mi) + ￿
FE (Xit ￿ Xi) + ￿it ￿ ￿i (3)
where for any variable Q;Qi represents the mean value for individual i over the t periods.
The two estimations are reported in Table 5. The results for the pooled regression mirror
those detailed in Table 2 for the LFS 2004:2, although the earnings di⁄erential of 15.6 percent (a
coe¢ cient of 0.145) for the combined category of married/living together is smaller than that found
for marriage alone in 2004. In the ￿xed e⁄ects model, the di⁄erential remains signi￿cant at the ten
percent level, but it falls by almost two-thirds of its value to 0.048, or 4.9 percent.13,14
TABLE 5 HERE
The large fall in the premium to marriage when we control for individual ￿xed e⁄ects is what
we would have expected given the practice of bridewealth in South Africa. Selection matters, and
without controlling for unobserved hetereogeneity in our samples of employed men, the marital
earnings premium will have a signi￿cant upwards bias. However, the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation does
not eliminate another source of potential bias deriving from the endogeneity of marriage. If men
with faster earnings growth are selected into marriage because they are more able to a⁄ord ilobolo
payments, then the ￿xed e⁄ects estimate for marriage will still be biased upwards.
We investigate endogeneity in marital status using a probit regression to test whether the nature
of earnings growth (￿Wi) over one year of the panel in￿ uences the probability of marriage occurring
(￿Mi) over the remaining periods of the panel. We estimate:
Pr(￿Mi) = ￿(￿Wi) + ’Xi + "i (4)
where for a total T waves of the panel, starting in wave t, and for individual i,
￿Mi = MiT ￿ Mit+2 (=1 if the man married/started living together and 0 otherwise)
￿Wi = (Wit+2 ￿ Wit)=Wit
Xi are individual characteristics (age and years of schooling) in initial wave t.
The sample in the estimation therefore is all African men who were present and employed for
more than one year (or more than three waves of the panel) and who were ￿never married￿in the ￿rst
year. This restricts our sample size dramatically to only 284 individual men. Nonetheless, as Table
6 illustrates, we ￿nd that the estimated coe¢ cient on earnings growth is positive and signi￿cant
at the ￿ve percent level. Higher earnings growth in an earlier period increases the probability
of ￿marriage￿in the subsequent period. Furthermore, because we cannot identify switchers who
change from living together to married, we may be underestimating the strength of this relationship.
TABLE 6 HERE
13As expected given the likely correlation between the time-invariant individual e⁄ects and the explanatory vari-
ables, a Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis that there is no systematic di⁄erence between the coe¢ cients from




, suggesting that a ￿xed e⁄ects model is more appropriate. We also
tested for, but found no evidence of, serial correlation among individual errors in the estimation.
14Sample sizes in the LFS panel are also too small to test whether there are di⁄erences in the ￿xed e⁄ects estimates
for marriage among employees and the self-employed, and for other population groups in South Africa. We ￿nd
positive coe¢ cients on marriage for these further estimations but the ￿xed e⁄ect estimates are not signi￿cant. We
cannot exclude the possibility that this is because of very small samples of switchers and therefore large standard
errors in the estimations.
9The LFS panel provides no family-background or other variables with which to instrument
for marriage in the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation, and thereby address the problem of endogeneity. One
possible instrument which we explored was sex ratios (by district council and by magisterial district),
derived from the original LFS cross-sections. The prediction is that in areas with higher ratios of
females to males, the probability of men marrying will also be higher. However, in South Africa,
sex ratios may misrepresent the marriage market because of the nature of labour migration, and
therefore they are not a robust instrument for marital status.
Restrictions on the urbanisation of Africans in apartheid South Africa gave rise to patterns of
circular or temporary labour migration. Africans, and particularly men, would migrate to places
of employment, but they would retain a base in their (mostly) rural households of origin, to which
they would return each year, and which was their permanent ￿home￿ . A key impetus for this labour
migration historically was for men to generate income needed for ilobolo payments (Hunter 2004).
Although restrictions on urbanisation no longer exist, evidence suggests that circular patterns of
labour migration have continued in post-apartheid South Africa (Posel and Casale 2006, Posel and
Casale 2003).
Individuals in household surveys (and in the national Census), however, are identi￿ed and
counted at their place of residency (where they spend most of their time). This means that estimated
sex ratios, which are calculated for resident individuals, may considerably under-represent the
number of men available for marriage in areas from which there is high male labour migration.
Furthermore, sex ratios may not be exogenous to earnings. A low ratio of females to males, for
example, may proxy for the probability of the man being a labour migrant, and therefore for higher
average earnings.
Although selection based on wage growth will upwardly bias the ￿xed e⁄ects estimate of the
marital earnings premium, there remain numerous sources of downward bias which we also cannot
control for. The most obvious comes from the con￿ ation of marriage and cohabitation. Where we
are able to distinguish between marriage and cohabitation at the cross-section, we ￿nd signi￿cant
di⁄erences in the respective earnings di⁄erentials. To the extent that this represents a ￿true￿return
to marriage over cohabitation, rather than selection, our ￿xed e⁄ects estimate on the con￿ ated
category will be biased downwards.
We may also be underestimating any real e⁄ects of marriage on earnings because we do not
have information on the number of years married (or living together). In the ￿xed e⁄ects model,
the marriage premium is estimated on the basis of changes in marital status over the course of
the panel. Consequently, the number of years married will be smaller for this group than for the
average married man. If the bene￿ts of marriage accrue over time, rather than immediately upon
marriage, then by not controlling for years married, the ￿xed e⁄ects coe¢ cient for marriage will be
biased downwards (Korenman and Neumark 1991).15,16
15That the bene￿ts to marriage may accrue over time is consistent with the larger coe¢ cient obtained on the
divorced/separated/widowed dummy in the ￿xed e⁄ects regression. The earnings advantage of this group of individ-
uals is likely to re￿ect a longer period of marriage than for the group of individuals who become married over the
three-year period of the panel.
16There are two further possible sources of underestimation. The ￿rst is an omitted variable problem - because
there are no household level variables available in the panel dataset, we cannot control for the number of children in
the household, for example. We found that the inclusion of this variable increased the size of the marital earnings
premium in the cross-section using the LFS 2004:2, although only slightly from 0.166 to 0.176. The second is possible
error in the measurement of marital status. If there is measurement error in the marital status variable, then the
attenuation bias will be even greater in the ￿xed e⁄ects estimates compared to the cross-sectional estimates.
105 Concluding comments
African men who are married are estimated to earn between 15 and 19 percent more at the cross-
section than other African men in South Africa, after controlling for a wide range of observable
characteristics. Much of this premium re￿ ects the positive selection of higher-earning men into
marriage. The large fall from the cross-sectional to the ￿xed e⁄ects estimate suggests that those
unmeasured characteristics which make men more productive in the labour market also make them
more desirable in the marriage market. Furthermore, unlike the few studies conducted for the
US, we ￿nd evidence that the probability of marriage over a period is positively related to the
growth in men￿ s earnings in the preceding period. These ￿ndings are consistent with the payment
of bridewealth creating a barrier to marriage in South Africa.
We cannot say anything meaningful about the real returns to marriage that remain after elim-
inating these sources of selection bias. Endogeneity in changes in marital status would suggest
that the small premium to marriage estimated in the ￿xed e⁄ects model is still upwardly biased.
However, there are good reasons to suspect that the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator also has downward
bias. Simple changes in the collection of data in household surveys ￿ensuring that marriage and
cohabitation are listed as two distinct responses in a question on marital status, and including a
question on the number of years married ￿would eliminate these sources of downward bias and
would greatly increase what we can say about the economic returns to marriage for men in South
Africa.
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Source: LFS 2004:2 
Notes: The sample is restricted to employed African men older than 15 years for whom a complete set 
of observations is available. All individuals who reported hours usually worked in excess of 140 hours 
or as zero, although employed, are dropped from the sample. A “large firm” comprises 50 employees 















13Table 2. Estimated earnings regressions for African men, 2004 
 
















































































No. children < 7 yrs        -0.009 
(0.011) 
No. children 7 – 14 yrs        -0.020*** 
(0.008) 
R
2 0.055 0.365 0.565 0.566 
Source: LFS 2004:2 
Notes: The sample is restricted to African men older than 15 years. The data are not weighted. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted marital status and education categories are “never 
married” and “no schooling” respectively. Regressions II to IV also control for province of residence, 
and estimations III and IV included 9 occupation dummies and 11 industry dummies which are not 
reported here. *** Significant at the 1 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level * Significant at 















Table 3. Estimated earnings regressions for African men, 2004 
 



































































Permanent employment    0.218*** 
(0.020) 
 








2 0.570 0.598 0.505 
Source: LFS 2004:2 
Notes: The sample is restricted to African men older than 15 years. The data are not weighted. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted marital status and education categories are “never 
married” and “no schooling” respectively. The estimations also include 9 province dummy variables, 9 
occupation and 11 industry dummies, and the number of children in the household, which are not 
reported here.  
















15Table 4. Sample characteristics of African employed men, 2001 and 2003 
 
 2001  2003 
 Panel  Original Panel Original 


































































































































Source: LFS 2001:2; LFS 2003:2; LFS Panel 
Notes: The data are not weighted. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The sample is all African 
men aged 15 years and older with employment. Hourly earnings are in real terms, using 2000 as the 
base year and CPI deflators provided by Statistics South Africa. All individuals who reported hours 
usually worked in excess of 140 hours or as zero, although employed, are dropped from the sample. A 


















16Table 5. Pooled and fixed effects earnings estimations 
 
  Pooled LFS  panel 
















Primary education  0.142*** 
(0.016) 
 
Incomplete secondary  0.323*** 
(0.017) 
 






Urban area  0.142*** 
(0.010) 
 













2 0.593 0.065(within) 
Source: LFS Panel (2001 – 2004) 
Notes: The sample is restricted to employed African men older than 15 years. The data are not 
weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. In both regressions, the omitted marital status variable is 
“never married”; in the pooled regression, the omitted education category is “no schooling”. The 
estimations also include 9 occupation, 11 industry and 6 wave dummies, not reported here; and the 
pooled estimation controlled further for province of residence. *** Significant at the 1 percent level ** 



















17Table 6. The probability of marriage and earnings growth 
 
Earnings growth over period (t+2) - t   0.0019** 
(0.0009) 
Age in initial wave t  0.0169 
(0.0155) 





Number of observations  284 
Source: LFS Panel (2001 – 2004) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The estimation excluded four outliers who reported 
earnings growth in excess of 600 percent between September 2001 and September 2002. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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